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Canadian politicians and jurists have been known to boast about the 
international impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
1
 
and of the Supreme Court of Canada. In testifying before the Ad Hoc 
Committee on Appointment of Supreme Court Justices in August 2004, 
then Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler asserted that 
the Supreme Court of Canada is respected around the world “as a model 
of what a vital, learned, and independent judicial institution should be … 
Supreme Court decisions are constantly cited by courts in diverse 
jurisdictions across the globe”.
2
 Elsewhere I have previously written 
about this phenomenon and identified what I described as a “Canadian 
model” of constitutionalism and the use of the Charter by jurisdictions 
such as Israel, South Africa and New Zealand, and how this could be 
viewed as an element of Canada‟s “soft power”.
3
 
                                                                                                             
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, Common Law Section. 
Thank you to Daphne Gilbert and Jamie Cameron for providing helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper and thank you to Kyle Kirkup, LL.B. 2009, for his excellent research 
assistance. The author gratefully acknowledges funding from the Law Foundation of Ontario which 
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1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 The Hon. Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P., “Speaking Notes for Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General of Canada, on the Occasion of a Presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Supreme Court of Canada Appointments” (August 25, 2004), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/ 
news-nouv/spe-disc/2004/doc_31212.html>. 
3 See Adam M. Dodek, “Canada as Constitutional Exporter: The Rise of the „Canadian 
Model‟ of Constitutionalism” (2007) 36 S.C.L.R. (2d) 309 (also published in Ian Peach et al., A 
Living Tree: The Legacy of 1982 in Canada’s Constitutional Evolution (Markham, ON: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2007); Adam M. Dodek, “The Protea and the Maple Leaf: The Impact of the Charter on 
South African Constitutionalism” (2004) 17 N.J.C.L. 353; and Adam M. Dodek, “The Charter … In 
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In this paper, I turn to the other end of the equation: the extent to 
which the Supreme Court of Canada uses the decisions of other countries 
in its constitutional interpretation. In this sense, I distinguish between 
“comparative” and “international” law. By “comparative” law, I mean 
the law of other jurisdictions, usually countries (such as those noted 
above) but also including supra-national entities such as the European 
Union. The key factor is that Canada is not part of whatever legal system 
is invoked and hence the foreign law is used in a purely comparative 
sense. The use of comparative law is thus the essence of “persuasive 
authority” — authority that has no official status in our jurisdiction; it 
attracts adherence rather than commanding it.
4
 Comparative law is thus 
to be distinguished from international law, which is the “law among 
states” and includes treaties, declarations, decisions, soft law, etc.
5
 
International law may have direct relevance to Canada as a state actor
6
 
and how Canadian courts deal with international law is an issue unto 
                                                                                                             
The Holy Land?” (1996) 8 Const. Forum 5. See also Sujit Choudhry, “Does the World Need More 
Canada? The Politics of the Canadian Model in Constitutional Politics and Political Theory” (2007) 
5 Int. J. Const. Law 606. On “soft power” see Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2004). 
4 See H.P. Glenn, “Persuasive Authority” (1987) 32 McGill L.J. 261, at 263. 
5 See, e.g., John H. Currie, Craig Forcese & Valerie Oosterveld, International Law; 
Doctrine, Practice and Theory (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007), at 4. See also John H. Currie, Public 
International Law, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008). 
6 To further complicate matters, at times international law may be used for comparative 
purposes. See Cassandra Kirewskie, “Extending the Theory of the Unwritten Constitution” (2007) 
37 S.C.L.R. (2d) 139, at 146-47; and Anne Warner La Forest, “Domestic Application of 
International Law in Charter Cases: Are We There Yet?” (2004) 37 U.B.C. L. Rev. 157, at 183 
[hereinafter “Warner La Forest, „Are We There Yet?‟ ”] (describing a “comparativist” approach to 
the use of international law wherein judges see themselves as actively engaged in international law 
and open to ideas from international, regional and comparative law, blurring the lines between 
international and comparative law). 
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itself.
7
 Together the use of comparative and international law may be 
conceived as facilitating an international “judicial dialogue”.
8
  
This paper examines the use of comparative law by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in its 2008 constitutional cases. In this paper, I attempt 
to strip away the rhetoric about the Supreme Court of Canada as a global 
constitutional actor and endeavour to analyze when and how it used 
comparative law in its constitutional cases during in the 2008 Term. My 
goal is to reveal what the use of comparative constitutional law looks like 
during this period and what broader questions this may lead us to pose.  
I conclude that the Supreme Court‟s use of comparative law in the 
2008 Term was quite modest.
9
 The Supreme Court decided 12 constitutional 
                                                                                                             
7 See, e.g., Hugh M. Kindred, “The Use and Abuse of International Legal Sources by 
Canadian Courts: Searching for a Principled Approach”, in Oonagh E. Fitzgerald, The Globalized 
Rule of Law: Relationships between International and Domestic Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006), at 
5; Anne Warner La Forest, “Evidence and International and Comparative Law”, in Oonagh E. 
Fitzgerald, id., at 367; Ed Morgan, “In the Penal Colony: Internationalism and the Canadian 
Constitutionalism” (1999) 49 U.T.L.J. 447; Warner La Forest, “Are We There Yet?”, id.; Robert 
Sze-Kwok Wai, “Justice Gérard La Forest and the Internationalist Turn in Canadian Jurisprudence”, 
in R. Johnson & J. McEvoy, eds., Gérard V. La Forest at The Supreme Court of Canada, 1985-1997 
(Winnipeg: Canadian Legal History Project & The Supreme Court of Canada Historical Society, 2000) 
471 [hereinafter “Wai”]; Karen Knop, “Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts” (2000) 
32 N.Y.U.J. Int‟l Law & Pol. 501; Stephen J. Toope, “The Uses of Metaphor: International Law and the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2001) 80 Can. Bar Rev. 534; Stephen J. Toope, “Inside and Out: The 
Stories of International Law and Domestic Law” (2001) 50 U.N.B.L.J. 11. 
8 I believe that Anne-Marie Slaughter, writing in 1994, was the first to use the term 
“judicial dialogue” and attempt to explain it with any comprehensiveness. See Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, “A Typology of Transjudicial Communication” (1994) 29 Univ. Richmond L. Rev. 99, at 
100 [hereinafter “Slaughter, „Typology‟ ”]: “Within both the European Union and the Council of 
Europe, courts are entering into forms of judicial dialogue … At the same time, national courts are 
also talking to each other.” See generally Claire L‟Heureux-Dubé, “The Importance of Dialogue: 
Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court” (1998) 34 Tulsa L.J. 15; Sujit 
Choudhry, “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional 
Adjudication” (1999) 74 Ind. L.J. 819, at 835-36, 855-65 (describing “dialogic interpretation”) 
[hereinafter “Choudhry, „Globalization‟”]; Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr., “„I‟d Like To Teach the 
World to Sing (In Perfect Harmony)‟: International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses — Reflections 
on the Perils and the Promise of International Judicial Dialogue” (2006) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1321 
(describing a strong and weak form of “international judicial dialogue” (“IJD”)) [hereinafter 
“Krotoszynski”]. 
9 While this paper is restricted to constitutional cases in the 2008 Term, research 
undertaken for this paper reviewed all Supreme Court decisions in the 2008 Term which revealed a 
comparable frequency of cases that contained some reference to foreign law as in the three of 12 (25 
per cent) constitutional cases that contained some reference to comparative law. Of the 69 decisions 
rendered by the Supreme Court in 2008, 15, or 22 per cent, contained citations to foreign authorities: 
Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] S.C.J. No. 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (S.C.C.) (administrative law); 
R. v. Kang-Brown, [2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kang-Brown”] 
(constitutional law; search and seizure); Societé de l’assurance automobile du Québec v. Cyr, [2008] 
S.C.J. No. 13, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 338 (S.C.C.) (administrative law); R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, 
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “M. (A.)”] (constitutional law; search and seizure); Canada 
(Justice) v. Khadr, [2008] S.C.J. No. 28, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 125 [hereinafter “Khadr”] (constitutional 
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cases in 2008.
10
 It used comparative law in three cases: Canada (Justice) 
v. Khadr,
11
 R. v. Kang-Brown,
12
 and R. v. M. (A.).
13
 The latter two were 
companion cases involving the use of sniffer dogs for searches. As I 
explain in this paper, in my analysis, the Supreme Court‟s use of 
comparative constitutional law in 2008 can be described in terms of 
limited engagement and missed opportunities.  
There are five parts to this paper in addition to this introduction. In 
Part II, I discuss why we should be interested in the use of comparative 
law in the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada. As many have 
stated, a court‟s legitimacy hinges on its interpretive methodology. The 
use of comparative law is part of this process and therefore worthy of 
analysis for this reason alone. However, beyond identifying this bare 
reason for why comparative law matters, I sketch out a brief version of 
my argument as to not only why comparative law matters but also why 
                                                                                                             
law; right to fair trial); New Brunswick (Human Rights Commission) v. Potash Corporation of 
Saskatchewan Inc., [2008] S.C.J. No. 46, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 604 (S.C.C.) (age discrimination under 
human rights code); R. v. H. (L.T.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 50, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 739 (S.C.C.) (criminal); 
R. v. M. (R.E.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 52, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) (criminal); H. (F.) v. McDougall, 
[2008] S.C.J. No. 54, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41 (S.C.C.) (torts); R. v. Rojas, [2008] S.C.J. No. 58, [2008] 3 
S.C.R. 111 (S.C.C.) (criminal); Saulnier v. Royal Bank of Canada, [2008] S.C.J. No. 60, [2008] 3 
S.C.R. 166 (S.C.C.) (bankruptcy); RBC Dominion Securities Inc. v. Merrill Lynch Canada, [2008] 
S.C.J. No. 56, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 79 (S.C.C.) (employment law); R. v. Mahalingan, [2008] S.C.J. No. 
64, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 316 (S.C.C.) (criminal); Canadian National Railway Co. v. Royal and Sun 
Alliance Insurance Co. of Canada, [2008] S.C.J. No. 67, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 53 (S.C.C.) (insurance); 
Apotex Inc. v. Sanofili Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] S.C.J. No. 63, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.) 
(patents). The three constitutional cases that contained references to foreign law are discussed in this 
paper. For a more detailed study of the use of foreign law from one jurisdiction across all types of 
Supreme Court of Canada decisions, see Peter McCormick, “American Citations and the McLachlin 
Court: An Empirical Study” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming) (draft on file with author) 
[hereinafter “McCormick, „American Citations‟”]. 
10 The 12 constitutional cases from 2008 are: 620 Connaught Ltd v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2008] S.C.J. No. 7, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 131 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 
[2008] 1 S.C.R. 96 (S.C.C.); Société des Acadiens et Acadiennes du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc. v. 
Canada, [2008 ] S.C.J. No. 15, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 383 (S.C.C.); Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), 
[2008] S.C.J. No. 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761 (S.C.C.); R. v. B. (D.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 25, [2008] 2 
S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). R. v. Wittwer, [2008] S.C.J. No. 33, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 235 (S.C.C.); Charkaoui v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] S.C.J. No. 39, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 326 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]; Kang-Brown, id.; M. 
(A.), id.; Khadr, id.; and Confédération des syndicats nationaux v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2008] S.C.J. No. 69, 2008 SCC 68 (S.C.C.). I adopt and use Professor Monahan‟s definition of 
“constitutional” cases: “A case is defined as a „constitutional case‟ if the decision of the Court 
involves the interpretation or application of a provision of the „Constitution of Canada‟, as defined in 
s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K), 1982, c. 11.” 
See, e.g., Patrick J. Monahan & James Yap, “Constitutional Cases 2008: An Overview” (2008) 47 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 3, note 1 [hereinafter “Monahan & Yap”]. 
11 Khadr, supra, note 9. 
12 Kang-Brown, supra, note 9. 
13 M. (A.), supra, note 9. 
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the Supreme Court should engage in comparative analysis in constitutional 
cases. With this analysis and argument, I turn in Part III to the actual use 
of comparative law in the two sniffer dog cases and explain why these 
cases demonstrate a limited form of engagement with foreign sources. I 
use the term “limited engagement” in a descriptive rather than a 
normative sense. Justice Binnie‟s extensive and deep use of American 
law goes significantly beyond the limited engagement of his colleagues. I 
then turn to the use of comparative law in Khadr in Part IV and explain 
how the Supreme Court‟s use of comparative law in this case is 
anomalous and does not really constitute comparative law at all. From 
this I move to Part V which examines the non-use of comparative law in 
R. v. Kapp,
14
 the Court‟s most important equality decision in a decade. In 
this part I explain why I view Kapp as a great missed opportunity for the 
use of comparative law. Finally, I end with some tentative conclusions 
about the Supreme Court‟s use of comparative law and some questions 
for further investigation. 
II. COMPARATIVE LAW: WHY BOTHER? 
As is well known in constitutional circles, over the first decade of the 
21st Century a battle raged over the use of comparative law at the U.S. 
Supreme Court as a result of the inclusion of foreign references in 
several cases, including Atkins v. Virginia,
15





 The modest use of comparative law in these cases 
unleashed a wave of scholarship, a torrent of political and popular 
criticism as well as a rare public debate between U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices on the subject.
18
 The use of comparative constitutional law in 
                                                                                                             
14 Supra, note 10. 
15 536 U.S. 304 (2002) [hereinafter “Atkins”] (holding that it was unconstitutional to 
execute mentally retarded offenders). 
16 539 U.S. 558 (2003) [hereinafter “Lawrence”] (holding that the criminalization of 
sodomy violates the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution). 
17 543 U.S. 551 (2005) [hereinafter “Roper”] (holding it unconstitutional to execute 
offenders who were minors at the time that they committed their crimes). 
18 The title of the debate was the “Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Decisions”. It was 
styled as a discussion between Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, moderated by N.Y.U. 
Law Professor Norman Dorsen, and the event was sponsored by the U.S. Association of 
Constitutional Law, which represents constitutional professors in the U.S. The discussion took place 
at Washington College of Law at American University in Washington, D.C. on January 13, 2005. A 
verbatim record of the discussion is available online at: <http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/ 
mediarel.nsf/1D265343BDC2189785256B810071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?
OpenDocument>. An edited version of the transcript has been published as “A conversation between 
U.S. Supreme Court justices” (2005) 3 Int. J. of Constitutional Law 519. See also Charles Lane, 
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Lawrence was seen to “portend a possible shift of tectonic plates”,
19
 
while soon after Roper was decided one critic of comparative 
constitutionalism saw in that case “the birth of a new comparative 
jurisprudence”.
20
 He remarked that the U.S. Supreme Court was not 
simply deciding a case in Roper, it was also “defining and defending a 
movement: a movement that has the potential to change the course of 
constitutional law”.
21
 Both proponents and opponents of these 
developments viewed the U.S. Supreme Court as becoming a participant 
in the international judicial dialogue referred to earlier. However, at the 
end of this decade, observations about any such trend and support or 
concern for American participation in this international dialogue appear 
vastly exaggerated. The U.S. Supreme Court has not used comparative 
law since John Roberts became Chief Justice in 2005.  
American fascination with the relatively modest use of comparative 
constitutional law contrasts sharply with the practices in other countries 
where comparative law is more frequently used but rarely questioned. In 
addition to Canada, the highest courts in South Africa, New Zealand, and 
Israel frequently cite decisions from other jurisdictions. To some degree, 
the American reaction (both negative and positive) to comparativism is 
exaggerated while in other countries the practice is under-theorized. Just 
as the vociferous objection to the use of foreign sources in the United 
States should not make its use illegitimate; similarly, the acquiescence to 
its use in Canada does not legitimize the comparative analysis in 
constitutional cases. 
The importance of analyzing the Supreme Court‟s use of 
comparative law is an aspect of the recurring question of the legitimacy 
                                                                                                             
“The Court is Open for Discussion: AU Students Get Rare Look at Justices‟ Legal Sparring”, 
Washington Post (January 14, 2005), A1. 
19 Donald E. Childress III, “Note, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to Resolve 
Domestic Federal Questions” (2003) 53 Duke L.J. 193, at 194. 
20 Roger P. Alford, “Roper v. Simmons and Our Constitution in International Equipoise” 
(2005) 53 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1, at 3. 
21 Alford, id. For a more modest view of the novelty of the use of foreign sources in Roper, 
supra, note 17, see A. Mark Weisburd, “Roper and the Use of International Sources” (2005) 45 Va. 
J. Int‟l L. 789, at 798 (dismissing the view of Roper‟s international references as constituting 
“harbingers of a wholesale importation of foreign or international derived concepts into American 
constitutional law” and arguing that Roper takes an approach to foreign and international decisions 
consistent with their use in prior Eighth Amendment cases and leaves open the question of the 
impact of such sources in other areas of American constitutional law where they have traditionally 
been considered irrelevant). 
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of the exercise of judicial power.
22
 Courts are supposed to be different 
from political actors. This simple assertion has led to deep and divisive 
battles between realist and anti-realist scholars over the last century 
which continued with the rise of critical legal studies in the academy. 
The need for judges to justify their interpretive methodology extends to 
their use of comparative law. As Sujit Choudhry has argued, courts‟ very 
legitimacy hinges on interpretive methodology, so “courts must explain 
why comparative law should count”.
23
 If they do not, “judicial review is 
open to the charge of simply being politics by other means … In each 
and every country where the migration of constitutional ideas is on the 
rise, the demands of justification must be met”.
24
 In the American 
context, the question has been posed as to why a court should resort to 
comparative material to resolve whether a particular measure violates a 
particular provision of its own constitution?
25
 This question applies with 
equal force to the use of comparative law by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in its constitutional cases. 
Attempts to justify the use of comparative law in constitutional cases 
can generally be classified in terms of thin or thick universalism.
26
 The 
basic premise of universalist approaches is that constitutions around the 
world share certain fundamental principles.
27
 Universalist approaches to 
comparative law differ in the extent to which they emphasize normative 
or procedural elements. Thick universalism has both normative and 
process-based content. It posits the strong universal application of 
specific norms and values as well as a global network that facilitates the 
                                                                                                             
22 For more on this question of legitimacy, see Adam M. Dodek, “A Tale of Two Maps: 
The Limits of Universalism in Comparative Judicial Review” (2009) 47:2 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
(forthcoming). 
23 Sujit Choudhry, “Migration as a New Metaphor in Comparative Constitutional Law”, in 
Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (New York & Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) 1, at 5.  
24 Choudhry, id. 
25 Roger P. Alford, “In Search of a Theory For Constitutional Comparativism” (2005) 52 
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 639, at 644 (asking why the U.S. Supreme Court should “resort to comparative 
material as a device to resolve whether a particular measure violates a particular provision of the 
U.S. Constitution”). 
26 What I call thick and thin universalism parallels to some degree Ronald Krotoszynski‟s 
strong and weak forms of “International Judicial Dialogue” (IJD). See Krotoszynski, supra, note 8, 
at 1323-25. 
27 Mark Tushnet, “Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law” in 
Sujit Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) 67, at 69 [hereinafter “Tushnet, „Some Reflections on Method in Comparative 
Constitutional Law‟”]. See, e.g., David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995) and David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford and New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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communication and reinforcement of these values. In a thick universalist 
model, comparative constitutional law is an imperative. It becomes the 
conduit for the communication of universal norms and values between 
and among constitutional systems.
28
 At times it is conceived in terms of a 
dialogue between those who study comparative constitutional law and 
those who study international human rights.
29
 Thus, one of the most 
concise articulations of this approach is provided by Harold Koh, who 
contends that concepts like liberty, equality and privacy are not exclusive 
to any particular constitution but are part and parcel of the global human 
rights movement. There are many civilized societies with human rights 
concepts constantly evolving as courts in different countries apply 
“somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat similar circumstances”.
30
 
Former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Claire L‟Heureux-Dubé 
asserted that links to international law help to form a kind of “common 
denominator” for constitutional interpretation around the world.
31
 The 
similarity in context and values provides the basis for universalist claims 
to comparison. 
In contrast, thin universalism presents a more modest argument 
about universal values. It recognizes the existence of a global network of 
courts as an interchange for ideas, but its focus is more on the universal 
nature of problems that courts face rather than on the norms that apply. It 
is problem-based rather than norm-centred. A thin universalist believes 
that comparative constitutional law may be of assistance because courts 
around the world face common problems.
32
 A thick universalist believes 
                                                                                                             
28 Three leading examples of thick universalism are Aharon Barak‟s purposive 
interpretation, David Beatty‟s ultimate rule of law and Lorraine Weinrib‟s postwar paradigm. See 
Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2005); David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1995); David Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004); Lorraine E. Weinrib, “The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism” in Sujit 
Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas, supra, note 23, 84; and Lorraine E. Weinrib, 
“Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism” in Vicki C. Jackson & Mark 
Tushnet, eds., Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 
at 3. 
29 See Tushnet, “Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law”, supra, 
note 27, at 69. 
30 Harold Koh, “International Law as Part of Our Law” (2004) 98 Am. J. Int‟l Law 43, at 54 
quoting Stephen Breyer, “Keynote Address” (2003) 97 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 265. 
31 Claire L‟Heureux-Dubé, “The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International 
Impact of the Rehnquist Court” (1998) 34 Tulsa L.J. 15, at 24 [hereinafter “L‟Heureux-Dubé, „The 
Importance of Dialogue‟”]. 
32 See e.g., id., at 23: 
(2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) COMPARATIVE LAW 453 
that the translation of norms between constitutional courts requires 
comparative law. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter has developed the process-based aspect of 
thin universalism in the most detail through her idea of the existence of a 
global network of judges.
33
 In Slaughter‟s New World Order, government 
networks — judicial among them — are understood as a form of global 
governance as well as foreign policy.
34
 Constitutional cross-fertilization 
is one feature of this judicial network.
35
 Slaughter‟s account is thinly 
universal in that it describes the participation of courts in a common 
judicial enterprise but it recognizes the possibility of conflict and 
embraces pluralism and legitimate difference.
36
 It lacks the universalizing 
element common to thick universalist accounts. Instead, it recognizes the 
variety of different approaches to similar legal problems. Her thinly 
universal account describes the existence of a “spirit of genuine 




Justice Claire L‟Heureux-Dubé is a leading proponent and theorist of 
judicial comparativism. Her 1998 article was one of the first to explain, 
promote and defend the practice that has become known as “international 
judicial dialogue”. In “The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and 
the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court”, she argued that 
globalization was facilitating this international judicial dialogue. She 
attributed this development to a number of factors: similarity of issues 
facing courts around the world; the international nature of human rights; 




                                                                                                             
perhaps more than ever, the same issues are facing many courts throughout the world. 
Issues like assisted suicide, abortion, hate speech, gay and lesbian rights, environmental 
protection, privacy, and the nature of democracy are being placed before judges in 
different jurisdictions at approximately the same time. As social debates and discussion 
around the world become more and more similar, so, of course, do the equivalent legal 
debates. 
33 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), at 65-103 (describing the existence and workings of a global legal system); Anne-
Marie Slaughter, “A Brave New Judicial World” in Michael Ignatieff, ed., American Exceptionalism 
and Human Rights (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005); Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
“A Global Community of Courts” (2003) 44 Harv. Int‟l L.J. 191; Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Judicial 
Globalization” (2000) Virginia J. of Int‟l Law 1103; Slaughter, “Typology”, supra, note 8. 
34 Slaughter, New World Order, id., at 1-4. 
35 Id., at 69. 
36 Id., at 68-69.  
37 Id., at 78. 
38 L‟Heureux-Dubé, “The Importance of Dialogue”, supra, note 31, at 23-26. 
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I subscribe to a thin universalist vision of constitutional law for 
Canada.
39
 Constitutional courts like the Supreme Court of Canada 
certainly face common problems, but I do not believe that the goal for 
Canada (nor for other countries) should be the convergence towards 
common norms or solutions.
40
 Rather, I believe that the use of 
comparative law can strengthen the legitimacy of the reasons of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Courts face common problems and 
consideration of how other courts have addressed them can act as an 
accountability mechanism for judicial discretion. In constitutional cases, 
comparative law can play an important role because of the enduring 
nature of constitutional rulings which are generally not subject to 
legislative override and may take years for a court to revisit.
41
 
The comparative inquiry can also assist the Court to understand the 
uniqueness of our Constitution and reach a decision appropriate for our 
circumstances. Over a half century ago, Bora Laskin implored the 
newly supreme Supreme Court to engage in this sort of inquiry.
42
 What 
                                                                                                             
39 See Adam M. Dodek, Complementary Comparativism: A Jurisprudence of Justification 
(LL.M. Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 2008) [unpublished]. 
40 Jeremy Waldron has argued that foreign and international law constitute a modern ius 
gentium which represents an international consensus of civilized nations on various constitutional 
issues. Analogizing to the sciences, Waldron‟s ius gentium idea is that “solutions to certain kinds of 
problems in the law might be best established in the way that scientific theories are established. They 
do not get established as infallible, they change over the years, and there are always outliers who 
refuse to accept them — some cranky, some whose reluctance leads eventually to progress”. Jeremy 
Waldron, “Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium” (2005) 119 Harv. L. Rev. 129, at 144. Eric 
Posner and Cass Sunstein use the Condorcet Jury Theorem to make a slightly different argument. 
See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, “The Law of Other Nations” (2006) 59 Stan. L. Rev. 131. 
Under Posner and Sunstein‟s account, the practices of other states provide relevant information 
which courts ought not to ignore. The Condorcet Jury Theorem asserts that if the majority of states 
believe that something is true, there is reason to believe that it is in fact true: id., at 136. The authors 
assert that the Jury Theorem cautions when such information would be relevant by imposing three 
conditions on the consideration of foreign practices: (1) those practices reflect the judgment of the 
affected population or decision makers; (2) the other state is sufficiently similar; and (3) the 
judgment embodied in the practice of the other state is independent: id. I have vastly simplified 
Posner and Sunstein‟s argument, which is far more complicated than I have summarized here. 
41 Cass Sunstein has written about the spectre of “the risk of future regret” due either to 
over- or under-inclusiveness of judicial reasons. Cass R. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements” (1995) 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733, at 1755. A good example of this is the Supreme Court 
of Canada‟s decision in R. v. Askov, [1990] S.C.J. No. 106, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 (S.C.C.). Justice 
Peter Cory stated publicly that he and his high court colleagues were taken by surprise by the 
government‟s response of staying thousands of criminal charges following his Court‟s decision in 
Askov, on the right to trial within a reasonable time. See David Vienneau, “High court shocked at 
Ontario dismissals” Toronto Star (July 16, 1991), A9. Canada‟s Askov experience would be useful 
knowledge for a court considering a similar issue and comparative analysis may have been of 
assistance in Askov. 
42 See Bora Laskin, “The Supreme Court of Canada: A Final Court of and for Canadians” 
(1951) 27 Can. Bar Rev. 1038, at 1045-47. This portion of Laskin‟s article is discussed in Philip 
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has changed since Laskin‟s time is the availability and speed of access 
to constitutional decisions of other countries. Thin universalists like 
L‟Heureux-Dubé J. and Anne-Marie Slaughter argue that globalization 
facilitates comparativism. I contend that globalization necessitates it. In 
1951, Bora Laskin thought that comparativism was worth the bother; his 
arguments have only strengthened since that time. 
III. LIMITED ENGAGEMENT: SNIFFER DOGS 
Most accounts of the use of comparative law by the Supreme Court 
of Canada have focused on the prevalence of the use of foreign sources
43
 
or the use of foreign sources from a single jurisdiction, usually the 
United States.
44
 They tend to involve quantitative assessments of the 
Court‟s use of foreign sources.
45
 Such analyses are necessary but not 
sufficient accounts of the use of comparative law. Here I attempt to 
complement these quantitative accounts with a detailed qualitative 
account of how and under what circumstances comparative law was used 
and not used in several cases in 2008. In this part, I examine its use in the 
two sniffer dog cases in the 2008 Term.  
                                                                                                             
Girard, Bora Laskin: Bringing Law to Life (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Legal History, 2005), 
at 202. 
43 See, e.g., Peter McCormick, “American Citations and the McLachlin Court: An 
Empirical Study” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. (forthcoming) (draft on file with author); Peter 
McCormick, “The Supreme Court of Canada and American Citations 1945-1994: A Statistical 
Overview” (1997) 8 S.C.L.R. (2d) 527; Bijon Roy, “An Empirical Survey of Foreign Jurisprudence 
and International Instruments in Charter Litigation” (2004) U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 99. 
44 See J.M. McIntyre, “The Use of American Cases in Canadian Courts” (1964) 2 U.B.C. L. 
Rev. 478; S.I. Bushnell, “The Use of American Cases” (1986) 25 U.N.B.L.J. 157; Robert Harvie & 
Hamar Foster, “Ties that Bind? The Supreme Court of Canada, American Jurisprudence, and the 
Revision of Canadian Criminal Law under the Charter” (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 729; Robert 
Harvie & Hamar Foster, “Different Drummers, Different Drums: The Supreme Court of Canada, 
American Jurisprudence and the Continuing Revision of Criminal Law under the Charter” (1992) 24 
Ottawa L. Rev. 41; Gerard La Forest, “The Use of American Precedents in Canadian Courts” (1994) 
46 Maine L. Rev. 211; Christopher P. Manfredi, “The Use of United States Decisions by the 
Supreme Court of Canada under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1990) 23 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 
499; Christopher P. Manfredi, “The Canadian Supreme Court and American Judicial Review: United 
States Constitutional Jurisprudence and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1992) 40 
Am. J. Comp. L. 213.  
45 Manfredi is an exception in this respect. See Christopher P. Manfredi, “The Use of 
United States Decisions”, id.; Christopher P. Manfredi, “The Canadian Supreme Court and 
American Judicial Review”, id. See also Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, “A Tool, Not a Master: The 
Use of Foreign Case Law in Canada and South Africa” (2001) 34 Comp. Pol. St. 1188; Rebecca 
Lefler, “A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as Persuasive Authority by the 
United States Supreme Court, The Supreme Court of Canada and the High Court of Australia” 
(2001) S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 165. 
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In April 2008, a deeply divided court decided the two sniffer-dog 
cases, Kang-Brown and M. (A.). A sniffer dog is a police canine that is 
trained to sniff narcotics through clothes or luggage and respond 
affirmatively. Kang-Brown involved the use of sniffer dogs by the 
RCMP at the Calgary bus terminal. M. (A.) involved their use by the 
police at a high school in Sarnia, Ontario at the invitation of the school‟s 
principal. In both cases, the Court divided the same way: LeBel J. wrote 
a short judgment for a plurality of four justices,
46
 Binnie J. wrote a long 
set of partially concurring reasons for himself and the Chief Justice,
47
 
Deschamps J. wrote dissenting reasons for herself and Rothstein J.,
48
 and 
Bastarache J. wrote his own dissenting reasons.
49
 These cases are the 
high-water mark for comparative constitutional law at the Supreme Court 
in 2008
50
 yet they also demonstrate the Supreme Court‟s limited 
engagement in this area. 
The Supreme Court‟s engagement with comparative law is limited in 
a number of senses. It is limited because these are the only cases in the 
2008 Term where the Supreme Court uses foreign law in a comparative 
sense. As discussed in the next section, the use of foreign law in Khadr is 
of a different character. The Court‟s use of comparative law is further 
limited because Binnie J. makes more use of foreign sources than all the 
other judges combined.
51
 The engagement with comparative law is 
further limited because with the exception of Binnie J., most of its use 
lacks much depth of analysis. While the engagement in these cases is 
limited, the use of comparative sources in the sniffer dog cases should 
not be considered surprising. 
Search and seizure cases under the Charter lend themselves to 
comparativism for a number of reasons. First, the right to be free from 
unreasonable search or seizure is a general right that faces the challenge 
of being applied in innumerable contexts. It is thus not a specific right 
like the right to trial by jury in criminal cases
52
 or the right to use English 
or French in Parliament.
53
 Section 8 of the Charter starkly provides that 
                                                                                                             
46 Kang-Brown, supra, note 9, at paras. 1-17 per LeBel J. (Fish, Abella and Charron JJ., 
concurring); M. (A.), supra, note 9, at paras. 1-2. 
47 Kang-Brown, id., at paras. 18-105; M. (A.), id., at paras. 3-99. 
48 Kang-Brown, id., at paras. 106-211; M. (A.), id., at paras. 100-149. 
49 Kang-Brown, id., at paras. 212-256; M. (A.), id., at paras. 150-191. 
50 See McCormick, “American Citations”, supra, note 9. 
51 Justice Binnie‟s use of comparative law in this constitutional area appears to be 
consistent with the Court‟s general trend in this area. See McCormick, id. 
52 See Charter, s. 11(f). 
53 See Charter, s. 17(1). 
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“[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure.” As Binnie J. noted in M. (A.), section 8 “has proven to be one of 
the most elusive Charter provisions despite the apparent simplicity of its 
language”.
54
 Second, on the level of principle, the right to be free from 
unreasonable search and seizure is in no way uniquely Canadian (as say 
perhaps language rights are), but is found in the constitutional systems of 
many countries. Thus the values or the purposes underlying the right are 
widely perceived as universal ones: privacy and autonomy. They 
transcend national boundaries and adhere to individuals as human beings. 
They implicate philosophical inquiry and the need to develop an 
analytical framework for their practical application. At first glance, such 
an assertion supports thick universalist constitutional visions outlined in 
Part II. However, this is misleading in two interrelated respects. The goal 
is not the convergence of universal norms such as privacy and autonomy 
in part because even if such norms can be considered universal or 
universalizing, they are too abstract to provide answers to the concrete 
disputes that courts face in the context of search and seizure issues. So 
while the Supreme Court recognized in Hunter v. Southam Inc.
55
 that the 
jurisprudential foundations of section 8 drew inspiration from American 
Fourth Amendment decisions,
56
 comparativism is the beginning not the 
end of the inquiry. 
Third, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is a 
right that in particular intersects with the dynamic nature of society and 
changes in technology. In addition to the sniffer-dog cases, recent search 





 and body-scan imaging for lie detection.
59
 As demonstrated 
                                                                                                             
54 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at para. 5. 
55 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.). 
56 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at para. 10, per Binnie J. It is also notable that the leading 
American treatise on the Fourth Amendment, upon which the Supreme Court relies in M. (A.) and 
Kang-Brown, is six volumes and over 5,000 pages long, providing a wealth of comparative material 
for consideration. See Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, 
4th ed. (Minnesota: West Publishing, 2004) [hereinafter “LaFave”]. 
57 See R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432 (S.C.C.). See generally 
James A. Fontana, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada, 6th ed. (Markham, ON: Butterworths, 
2005), at 597; Scott C. Hutchison, James C. Morton & Michael P. Bury, Search and Seizure Law in 
Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2005). 
58 See LaFave, supra, note 56, § 2.2(f). See Daphne Gilbert, Ian R. Kerr & Jena McGill, 
“The Medium and the Message: Personal Privacy and the Forced Marriage of Police and 
Telecommunications Providers” (2007) 51 Crim. L.Q. 469. 
59 LaFave, id., at § 2.2(d). See generally Ian R. Kerr, Max Binnie & Cynthia Aoki, 
“Tessling on My Brain: The Future of Lie Detection and Brain Privacy in the Criminal Justice 
System” (2008) Can. J. Crimin. & Crim. Just. 8. 
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in Kang-Brown, the use of such technologies often originates in one 
country and then is adopted by other countries. In Kang-Brown, the 
RCMP officers who searched the Calgary bus depot had trained in the 
United States in the GATEWAY program there.
60
 Because the underlying 
factual circumstances that raise issues of the reasonableness of search 
and seizure arise or may originate in other jurisdictions, it would make 
sense for courts to examine how those foreign jurisdictions have 
addressed the constitutional issues that arise with such use. 
Kang-Brown and M. (A.) demonstrate the thin universalism that I 
asserted in Part II provides the normative foundation for comparativism 
in constitutional adjudication at the Supreme Court of Canada. These 
cases are about the impact of globalization, the drug trade being an 
example of a globalized activity that crosses national borders. In part, the 
division of opinion among the justices reflects differing approaches to 
questions on this issue. Is a bus station like an airport or a border 
crossing? Is entering a schoolyard equivalent to crossing the border of a 
foreign state? In Kang-Brown, Binnie J. answers both questions in the 
negative: “[b]order considerations do not apply at the Calgary bus station 
or at the local public school in A.M. Nobody should expect to be 
randomly cross-examined by the police when boarding the Vancouver to 
Calgary bus.”
61
 In M. (A.), LeBel J. states that “[e]ntering a schoolyard 
does not amount to crossing the border of a foreign state.”
62
 In Kang-
Brown, Deschamps J. states that “[d]rug traffickers have shown that there 
are no limits to their imagination when it comes to concealing hard 
drugs, whose odours are often imperceptible to humans, and then 
spiriting them across international borders and across the country.”
63
 
Similarly, Bastarache J. concludes that bus depots are analogous to 
airports.
64
 This globalization invites comparison, both at the level of the 
factual circumstances as well as at the level of constitutional doctrine. 
Moreover, globalization necessitates comparison because not only is the 
comparison possible because of the common problems faced by such 
technology across borders, but another aspect of globalization — the 
globalized nature of communications — makes access to information 
                                                                                                             
60 Kang-Brown, supra, note 9, at para. 88. 
61 Id., at para. 71. 
62 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at para. 1. 
63 Kang-Brown, supra, note 9, at para. 207. 
64 Id., at para. 251: “a public bus terminal is precisely the type of environment where a 
sniffer-dog search subsequent to generalized suspicion is appropriate … I find public depots to be 
analogous to airports” (emphasis in original). 
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regarding the practices and jurisprudence of other jurisdictions readily 
available. In such circumstances, the failure to engage in comparison has 
the potential to raise questions about the legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court‟s decision. 
I begin by examining Binnie J.‟s use of comparative law because it is 
the most extensive and because he explicitly recognizes the impact of 
American jurisprudence on Hunter v. Southam Inc. and the subsequent 
development of the Canadian law of search and seizure.
65
 After this 
acknowledgment, Binnie J. proceeds to directly confront the American 
Supreme Court jurisprudence which has found that the use of narcotic 
sniffer dogs lies entirely outside the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. Justice Binnie explains this decision as being motivated by 
what I would term pragmatic considerations by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
He speculates that the American decision may be a function of the fear 
that once a police activity has been found to engage a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, it triggers a presumption of necessity for prior 
judicial authorization, i.e., a warrant.
66
 Later in his opinion in M. (A.), 
Binnie J. implicitly distinguishes between what is generally an all-or-
nothing approach in American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the 
more tiered framework of Canadian search and seizure law.
67
 What is 
notable here is the extent to which Binnie J. confronts the authority 
against the position that he ultimately adopts.
68
 
Justice Binnie expressly disagrees with the decision to place the use 
of police sniffer dogs outside of constitutional regulation, although he 
does accept the empirical basis for the American decision: “the 
                                                                                                             
65 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at para. 10. 
66 Id. 
67 Id., at paras. 52-55. Justice Binnie notes that the “all-or-nothing” approach to the U.S. 
Fourth Amendment was eventually rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968), where that Court authorized warrantless investigative police “stops” based on a 
standard of reasonable suspicion (i.e., “Terry stops”). Justice Binnie notes that this approach was 
accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in a prior case. M. (A.), id., at para. 53. However, he notes 
that the American approach is still far more categorical than the Canadian, which is more nuanced. 
Justice Binnie states that “our jurisprudence … recognizes that within the Charter the need for 
privacy „can vary with the nature of the matter sought to be protected, the circumstances in which 
and the place where state intrusion occurs, and the purposes of the intrusion‟ ” (quoting R. v. 
Colarusso, [1994] S.C.J. No. 2, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, at 53 (S.C.C.)). M. (A.), id., at para. 55. 
68 On the use of comparative law as a “negative comparison” see, e.g., Tania Groppi, “A 
User-friendly Court: The Influence of Supreme Court of Canada Decisions Since 1982 on Court 
Decisions in Other Liberal Democracies” (2007) 36 S.C.L.R. (2d) 337, at 344 [hereinafter 
“Groppi”]. Robert Wai has suggested that La Forest J. frequently used American jurisprudence in 
this respect. See Wai, supra, note 7, noting that where La Forest J. referred to comparative law at 
length it was mostly American law and was mostly used to distinguish his position.  
460 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
minimally intrusive, contraband-specific nature and, where established, 
accurate olfactory capacity of a properly trained dog”.
69
 Thus, Binnie J. 
accepts the foreign facts but not the legal conclusion. The American legal 
framework remains influential however because it leads Binnie J. to 
articulate a standard of “reasonable suspicion” as the basis for the police 
use of sniffer dogs and to conclude that in such cases, no prior judicial 
authorization will be required.
70
 Justice Binnie uses the comparative 
jurisprudence not as a source of inspiration for ideas to be adopted or 
transplanted, but in a dialogical fashion — to identify differences 
between the Canadian and American approaches and to develop a 
distinctly Canadian framework for the issue.
71
 
Justice Binnie continues to directly confront American jurisprudence 
in M. (A.) because the Crown relied on it in asserting that a student has 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband. Justice Binnie 
reviews three U.S. Supreme Court cases upon which the Crown relies.
72
 
He distinguishes this line of American cases by focusing not on the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband, but on the students‟ 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their backpacks, likening them to 
briefcases, purses and suitcases. In a triumph for students‟ rights, Binnie 
J. asserts that “[n]o doubt ordinary businessmen and businesswomen 
riding along on public transit or going up and down on elevators in office 
towers would be outraged at any suggestion that the contents of their 
briefcases could randomly be inspected by the police without any 
„reasonable suspicion‟ of illegality.”
73
 Thus, Binnie J. concludes that 
backpacks objectively command a measure of privacy because of the role 
that they play in the lives of students.
74
  
Justice Binnie still must tackle the Crown‟s American-inspired 
argument that there is no legitimate privacy interest in contraband. Here 
he cites the proposition of the U.S. Supreme Court being urged upon the 
Court by the Attorneys General: “because the [dog‟s] sniff can only 
reveal the presence of items devoid of any legal use, the sniff „does not 
implicate legitimate privacy interests‟ and is not to be treated as a 
                                                                                                             
69 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at para. 11. 
70 Id., at paras. 12-13. 
71 Cf. L‟Heureux-Dubé, “The Importance of Dialogue”, supra, note 31; and Choudhry, 
“Globalization”, supra, note 8, at 835-36, 855-65 (describing “dialogic interpretation”). 
72 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at paras. 56-60, citing and discussing United States v. Place, 462 
U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); and Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 
405 (2005). 
73 M. (A.), id., at para. 62. 
74 Id. 
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search”.
75
 Justice Binnie rejects the American position on two bases. 
First, he discusses the serious problems that it has created in its own 
jurisdiction, giving the example of a raid on a school of 2,780 students 
where the students were locked down but the media was invited in and 
the dog in that case falsely identified a student as having contraband (she 
had in fact been playing with one of her own dogs on the morning of the 
search and her dog was in heat).
76
 Second, Binnie J. uses prior Canadian 
jurisprudence to demonstrate that the American authorities are asking the 
wrong question — at least in respect to how the constitutional protection 
of privacy is understood in this country. Justice Binnie quotes La Forest 
J. from a 1990 case: 
[I]t would be an error to suppose that the question that must be asked in 
these circumstances is whether persons who engage in illegal activity 
behind the locked door of a hotel room have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Rather, the question must be framed in broad and neutral 
terms so as to become whether in a society such as ours persons who 




To continue to drive a wedge between the American jurisprudence and 
its applicability to Canada, Binnie J. notes that even in the United States 
the position is not uniform and numerous judges continue to argue for the 
wider privacy interest, quoting at length from a 1984 dissent of Brennan 
J.‟s (in which Thurgood Marshall J. concurred).
78
 Similarly, Binnie J. 
                                                                                                             
75 M. (A.), id., at para. 69, quoting United States v. Place, supra, note 72, at 707 and Illinois 
v. Caballes, supra, note 72, at 411. 
76 M. (A.), id., at para. 69. 
77 R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 50 (S.C.C.), per La Forest J., 
quoted in M. (A.), id., at para. 70. 
78 M. (A.), id., at para. 71, quoting Brennan J., dissenting (Marshall J. concurring) in United 
States v. Jacobsen, supra, note 72, at 138, as follows:  
[U]nder the Court‟s analysis in these cases, law enforcement officers could release a 
trained cocaine-sensitive dog — to paraphrase the California Court of Appeal, a “canine 
cocaine connoisseur” — to roam the streets at random, alerting the officers to people 
carrying cocaine. Cf. People v. Evans, 65 Cal. App. 3d 924, 932, 134 Cal. Rptr. 436, 440 
(1977). Or, if a device were developed that, when aimed at a person, would detect 
instantaneously whether the person is carrying cocaine, there would be no Fourth 
Amendment bar, under the Court‟s approach, to the police setting up such a device on a 
street corner and scanning all passersby. In fact, the Court‟s analysis is so unbounded that 
if a device were developed that could detect, from the outside of a building, the presence 
of cocaine inside, there would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through 
a residential neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in which the drug is 
present. In short, under the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment first suggested in 
Place and first applied in this case, these surveillance techniques would not constitute 
searches and therefore could be freely pursued whenever and wherever law enforcement 
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quotes from the 2005 dissent of Ginsburg J. (Souter J. concurring) in 
Illinois v. Caballes: 
Under today‟s decision, every traffic stop could become an occasion to 
call in the dogs, to the distress and embarrassment of the law abiding 
population. … 
… Nor would motorists have constitutional grounds for complaint 
should police with dogs, stationed at long traffic lights, circle cars 
waiting for the red signal to turn green.
79
 
Essentially, Binnie J. concludes that he preferred Ginsburg J.‟s reasoning 
over that of the U.S. Supreme Court‟s majority. This is consistent with 
the Supreme Court of Canada‟s approach in focusing not on the object of 
the search but on where it takes place, leading Binnie J. to ultimately 
conclude that the ends of the search cannot justify its means.
80
 
In Kang-Brown, Binnie J. turned to comparative law to assist in 
determining this standard because Canadian jurisprudence was lacking in 
this area and because American jurisprudence had been used by the 
Ontario Court of Appeal in fashioning this test.
81
 In crafting the doctrinal 
standard, Binnie J. quotes from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in 
Alabama v. White on the difference between “reasonable suspicion” and 
reasonable grounds of belief (or what is called “probable cause” in 
American law): 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause 
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity and content than that required 
to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable 
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that 
required to show probable cause.
82
 
Having determined the standard, Binnie J. next turns to its content. 
                                                                                                             
officers desire. Hence, at some point in the future, if the Court stands by the theory it has 
adopted today, search warrants, probable cause, and even “reasonable suspicion” may 
very well become notions of the past. 
79 Supra, note 72, at 422, per Ginsburg J., dissenting (Souter J. concurring), quoted with 
approval by Binnie J. in M. (A.), id., at para. 71 (further citing K. Lammers, “Canine Sniffs: The 
Search That Isn‟t” (2003) 1 N.Y.U.J.L. & Liberty 845, at 849-50). 
80 M. (A.), id., at para. 72. 
81 Justice Binnie notes that in the context of entrapment Lamer J. had elected not to 
generalize about what “reasonable suspicion” constitutes. See Kang-Brown, supra, note 9, at para. 
75, citing R. v. Mack, [1988] S.C.J. No. 91, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 903, at 965 (S.C.C.) and also citing R. v. 
Cahill, [1992] B.C.J. No. 793, 13 C.R. (4th) 327 (B.C.C.A.). 
82 Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, at 330 (1990), quoted in Kang-Brown, id., at para. 75. 
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Justice Binnie then describes how the Ontario Court of Appeal 
reviewed American Fourth Amendment cases and was persuaded by 
their articulation of the need for objectively discernible facts as a 
prerequisite to a finding of reasonable cause in order to avoid indiscriminate 
and discriminatory exercises of the police power.
83
 Justice Binnie adopts 
this approach in determining objective indicators and applies it to the 
facts before him. He states that in American cases, production of false 
identification or travelling under an assumed name is a marker of 
reasonable suspicion as is flight from the police or furtive actions or an 
attempt to conceal one‟s true identity.
84
 In the case before him, neither 
marker was present. Similarly, Binnie J. agreed with the American 
position that Kang-Brown‟s opposition to what would have been a non-
consensual illegal search was not something that should be used against 
him as indicia of reasonable suspicion.
85
 In placing weight on these 
American decisions, Binnie J. implicitly recognizes their persuasive 
value and they play an important role in his decision.  
In moving from the general indicia of reasonable suspicion to the 
particular indicia in regards to drug trafficking, Binnie J. explicitly refers 
to the U.S. in identifying the objectives of Jetway and other programs as 
attempting to identify characteristics “generally associated with narcotics 
traffickers”
86
 without sweeping up “a very large category of presumably 
innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures 
were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this 
case could justify a seizure”.
87
 This reference is not surprising given that 




Up to this point, Binnie J. has engaged in what I would term 
“doctrinal comparativism”: the use of comparative law to develop 
categories and rules for analyzing a particular issue.
89
 In addition to this 
                                                                                                             
83 Kang-Brown, id., at para. 76, citing R. v. Simpson, [1993] O.J. No. 308, 12 O.R. (3d) 182, 
at 202 (Ont. C.A.), per Doherty J.A. 
84 Kang-Brown, id., at para. 87, citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); Sibron 
v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
85 Kang-Brown, id., at para. 92, citing United States v. Eustaquio, 198 F.3d 1068 (8th Cir. 
1999). 
86 Kang-Brown, id., at para. 79, citing LaFave, supra, note 56, vol. 4, at 503. 
87 Kang-Brown, id., quoting Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, at 441 (1980). 
88 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at para. 87. 
89 For different categories of comparison see Groppi, supra, note 68; Heinz Klug, “Model 
and Anti-Model: The United States Constitution and the „Rise of World Constitutionalism‟” (2000) 
Wisconsin L. Rev. 597; Kim Lane Schepelle, “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The 
Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models” (2003) 1:2 Int‟l J. 
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analytical comparativism, comparative law can also be used for empirical 
purposes, to draw on the experience of other countries to provide the 
necessary factual foundations for a constitutional conclusion.
90
 Each of 
Binnie, LeBel, Deschamps and Bastarache JJ. engages in empirical 
comparativism. 
In M. (A.), Binnie J. notes the lack of data in Canada regarding the 
efficacy of sniffer dogs. To address this gap, he turns to comparative law. 
He cites American cases where the dog erred and produced a false 
positive, i.e., wrongly identified individuals as having drugs in their 
possession or on their person when they did not.
91
 Justice Binnie then 
cites a report from the Ombudsman of the Australian state of New South 
Wales which involved 17 different sniffer dogs totalling over 10,000 
sniffer indications. The report found that these sniffs lead to a search 
successfully finding drugs in only 26 per cent of cases, leading the report 
to note (in a portion emphasized by Binnie J.): “[t]hat is, almost three-




Justice Deschamps uses comparative law to reach the opposite 
conclusion. In Kang-Brown, she uses comparative law to buttress her 
finding that sniffer dogs are an accurate and useful law enforcement tool. 
She states that sniffer dogs “have been used in Canada for decades to 
fulfill numerous law enforcement functions”, providing examples of 
different types of uses from Quebec
93
 and noting the trial judge‟s finding 
of a 92 per cent reliability for sniffer dogs, concluding that sniffer dogs 
can be likened to a very reliable informant.
94
 Justice Deschamps then 
turns to comparative law to support this empirical point, citing examples 
from Australia and the United States to show that “sniffer dogs have long 
                                                                                                             
Const. L. 296; Sujit Choudhry, “The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism” (2004) 2 Int‟l 
J. Const. L. 1. 
90 On analytical and empirical variants of comparative law see Choudhry, “Globalization”, 
supra, note 8; and Louis J. Blum, “Mixed Signals: The Limited Role of Comparative Analysis in 
Constitutional Adjudication” (2002) 39 San Diego L. Rev. 157, at 186-95. 
91 M. (A.), supra, note 9, at paras. 85-87. Justice Binnie notes that such positives may be the 
result of a number of factors: outright error or sniffing drug odours which attach to money; “[i]n the 
sniffer-dog business, there are many variables.” Id., at para. 88.  
92 M. (A.), id., at para. 86, quoting New South Wales Ombudsman, Review of the Police 
Powers (Drug Detection Dogs) Act 2001 (2006), at ii. 
93 Kang-Brown, supra, note 9, at para. 131 (noting that the provincial police force and 
municipal police forces in Quebec have used sniffer dogs to detect drugs and explosives and to find 
missing persons since the 1960s, and that Société de la faune et des parcs du Québec uses sniffer 
dogs to detect fish, meat and ammunition in order to intercept poachers). 
94 Id., at para. 132. 
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been used as a law enforcement tool in other countries”.
95
 She concludes 
on this point by stating that: 
[w]hile these examples do not obviate the need to engage in a critical 
review of the constitutionality of the use of sniffer dogs under s. 8 of 
the Charter, they do suggest that the sniffer dog has served as a helpful 
tool for various purposes, such as ensuring public safety, being 
proactive in preventing and detecting crime, investigating specific 
crimes and dealing with exigent circumstances.
96
  
For Justice Deschamps, comparative experience establishes a presumption.
97
 
Justice LeBel examines the comparative experience and reaches the 
opposite conclusion. Of LeBel J.‟s reasons in the two cases, Kang-Brown 
is the only one that is more than a few paragraphs. In this decision, he 
also reaches out to comparative law in an empirical functionalist way. He 
states that “serious doubt has occasionally been cast on the reliability of 
sniffer dogs” and proceeds to cite some of the authorities relied upon by 
Binnie J. to cast doubt on the accuracy of the sniffer dogs: the dissent of 
Souter J. in a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court case and the Discussion Paper by 
the Ombudsman of New South Wales.
98
  
Justice Deschamps moves from empirical comparativism to doctrinal 
comparativism in a way that demonstrates a limited engagement with the 
foreign sources. Ultimately, Deschamps J. adopts the reasonable suspicion 
standard for sniffer-dog searches. In justifying this decision, she rests in 
part on the justification that “numerous [American] state courts have 
adopted the reasonable suspicion standard for sniffer-dog searches” and 
proceeds to cite decisions from New York, New Hampshire, Alaska, 
Pennsylvania and one of the leading treatises on search and seizure that 
cites other state decisions. She also cites a U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                             
95 Id., at para. 133, citing (from Australia): Law Enforcement (Powers and Responsibilities) 
Act 2002 (N.S.W.), ss. 145-150 (drug detection dogs), and ss. 193-196 (firearms and explosives 
detection dogs); Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld.), 2000, No. 6, ss. 34-39, as 
amended by Police Powers and Responsibilities (Drug Detection Dogs) Amendment Act 2005 (Qld.), 
2005, No. 63; Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth.), s. 12A; and Questions of Law Reserved 
(No. 3 of 1998) (1998), 71 S.A.S.R. 223 (S.C.). From the United States, see Illinois v. Caballes, 
supra, note 72; People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990); State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 
710 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1990); McGaham v. State, 807 P.2d 506 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); and 
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 530 A.2d 74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).  
96 Kang-Brown, supra, note 9, at para. 133. 
97 See comments, supra, note 40, on the Condorcet Jury Theorem. 
98 See Kang-Brown, supra, note 9, at para. 15 (citing Illinois v. Caballes, supra, note 72, at 
410-13, per Souter J., dissenting and New South Wales Ombudsman, Discussion Paper: Review of 
Police Powers (Drug Detection Dogs) (2004)). 
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decision.
99
 The limited nature of her comparative inquiry is demonstrated 
by Deschamps J.‟s practice of simply citing a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision, the decisions of four state high courts and a leading American 
treatise on the subject. There is no discussion of what these courts said in 
these cases, let alone why she found their decisions persuasive. Rather, 
Deschamps J. appears to be stacking up the foreign authority in order to 
support her conclusion by the weight of decisions of relevant and 
respected high courts. 
Justice Bastarache also engages in a limited use of doctrinal 
comparativism. He begins by noting that sniffs are not even considered 
searches under the U.S. Constitution: “[i]t is the narrow specificity of the 
canine sniff search which led the United States Supreme Court to 
determine that it did not constitute a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” He then quotes 
two paragraphs from a 1983 U.S. Supreme Court decision.
100
 Justice 
Bastarache is not willing to go this far in the Canadian context, but he 
finds the American jurisprudence relevant nonetheless:  
Although I would not go so far as to say that the nature of the dog sniff 
renders it a “non-search” under the Canadian Charter, I do agree with 
the United States Supreme Court that a canine sniff is “much less 
intrusive” than other forms of police search.
101
  
Finally, at the end of his opinion, Bastarache J. invokes the constitutional 
experience of other countries to support his doctrinal conclusion that 
sniffer dogs should be allowed to be used to perform random, 
                                                                                                             
99 See United States v. Place, supra, note 72, at 723, cited in Kang-Brown, id., at para. 193. 
100 Kang-Brown, id., at para. 238, citing United States v. Place, id., at 707: 
A “canine sniff” by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not require 
opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would 
remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer‟s rummaging through 
the contents of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information is obtained through 
this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover, the 
sniff discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite 
the fact that the sniff tells the authorities something about the contents of the luggage, the 
information obtained is limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the 
property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate 
and more intrusive investigative methods. 
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis. We are aware of no other investigative 
procedure that is so limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and 
in the content of the information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we conclude that 
the particular course of investigation that the agents intended to pursue here — exposure 
of respondent‟s luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine — did 
not constitute a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 
101 Kang-Brown, id., at para. 239. 
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generalized searches. He states: “Finally, I wish to note that several other 
countries already allow sniffer dogs to perform random, generalized 
searches” and proceeds to cite the United States, the Australian state of 
Queensland, the United Kingdom and New Zealand.
102
 Like Deschamps 
J., Bastarache J. simply cites these jurisdictions without any further 
elaboration, indicating that he attributes some persuasive value by the 
bare fact of the existence of the practice of generalized dog sniffing in 
these jurisdictions. 
What we see in Kang-Brown and M. (A.) is a limited form of 
engagement with comparative law. Each judge does appear to see some 
relevance in the experience and the law of other countries but the nature 
of their respective comparative inquiries differs. Justices Deschamps and 
Bastarache use comparative law largely in a supporting role, to buttress 
their conclusion or to reinforce the empirical foundations for their legal 
conclusions.
103
 Justice LeBel uses comparative law in an even more 
limited sense, to strike a cautionary note about the efficacy of sniffer 
dogs. Only Binnie J. seems prepared to engage the comparative materials 
in any depth, but even he devotes little time to examining opposing 
authority. And all of the judges focus the great bulk of their energies on 
the United States, understandably so given the connections between our 
section 8 jurisprudence and the American Fourth Amendment, as well as 
the sheer volume of comparative experience south of the border. 
However, even the casual references to Australia, New Zealand and 
England indicate the existence of potentially relevant sources elsewhere. 
These references remain unexplored, raising more questions than they 
answer. From the most extensive use of comparative law in the 2008 
Term, I now turn to a most unusual use of it. 
                                                                                                             
102 Kang-Brown, id., at para. 253: 
Finally, I wish to note that several other countries already allow sniffer dogs to perform 
random, generalized searches. As has been previously mentioned, the United States 
Supreme Court held that dog sniffs are not “searches” under the Fourth Amendment, and 
random use of sniffer dogs is therefore permissible in that country. In Queensland, 
Australia, legislation allows drug dogs to search, without a warrant, at licensed premises; 
at any place at which a sporting, recreational, entertainment, or “special” event is being 
held; and at any “public place” (Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld.), 
2000, No. 6, ss. 34 to 36). The use of sniffer dogs is also common practice in the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand. 
103 On the use of comparative law in this respect see Groppi, supra, note 68. 
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IV. COMPARATIVE ANOMALY? CANADA V. KHADR 
The legal proceedings surrounding Omar Khadr have become well 
known. They are the subject of countless news profiles, a book and an 
organized campaign to repatriate the notorious Canadian youth detained 
by the American government since 2002 at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
104
 
Khadr was one of the first “detainees” to be tried by the military 
commissions set up by the Bush government, although that trial was 
adjourned indefinitely as part of President Obama‟s suspension of 
military commissions in one of his first acts as President of the United 
States.
105
 The Supreme Court of Canada case involved the attempt by 
Khadr‟s Canadian lawyers to obtain disclosure of the records of 
interviews conducted by Canadian officials of Khadr at Guantanamo. In 
a short decision authored by “The Court”, the Court ordered such 
disclosure, distinguishing its 2007 decision in R. v. Hape which held that 
the Charter does not apply to the conduct of Canadian agents operating 
outside of Canada, unless there are clear violations of international 
law.
106
 According to the Khadr Court, the crux of the issue was whether 
Khadr was being held in conformity with Canada‟s international 
obligations. If so, the Charter would have no application. If Canada was 
participating in a process that violated “Canada‟s binding obligations 




The Supreme Court thus articulated the critical issue as being 
whether Khadr‟s detainment complied with international law. Because 
the U.S. Supreme Court had pronounced on this issue, the Supreme 
Court of Canada reviewed its decisions. Thus, the Khadr Court reviewed 
                                                                                                             
104 See, e.g., Michelle Sheppard, Guantanamo’s Child: The Untold Story of Omar Khadr 
(Toronto: John Wiley, 2008); “The Omar Khadr Project”, online: <http://www.omarkhadrproject.com/>; 
“He Was 15”, online: <http://www.hewas15.com/>; University of Toronto Faculty of Law, “The 
Omar Khadr Page”, online: <http://www.law.utoronto.ca/faculty_content.asp?itemPath=1/3/4/0/0& 
contentId=1617>; Amnesty International, “Bring Omar Khadr to Justice. Bring him to Canada”, 
online: <http://www.amnesty.ca/take_action/actions/canada_bring_khadr_justice.php>.  
105 See “Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained At the Guantánamo Bay Naval 
Base and Closure of Detention Facilities”, Executive Order 13492 of January 22, 2009, 74: 16 
Federal Register 4897. 
106 [2007] S.C.J. No. 26, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.). For comment and analysis on this 
case see Donald J. Rennie & Ramona Rothschild, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
and Canadian Officials Abroad” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 127 and Kent Roach, “When Secret 
Intelligence Becomes Evidence: Some Implications of Khadr and Charkaoui II ” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 147. 
107 Khadr, supra, note 9, at para. 19. 
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the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Rasul v. Bush
108
 and Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld.
109
 In Rasul, the U.S. Supreme Court held that non-U.S. citizen 
Guantanamo detainees like Khadr could challenge the legality of their 
detention by way of the statutory right to habeas corpus. In Hamdan, the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that procedural rules for military commissions 
established by executive order violated both the American Uniform Code 
of Military Justice as well as the Geneva Conventions. The Khadr Court 
used foreign law not in a comparative sense but for the direct 
consequences of its holding: for the finding by the U.S. Supreme Court 
that American action had violated international law. From this finding, it 
found that the participation of Canadian officials in interviewing Khadr 
at Guantanamo implicated them in a violation of international law. 
As Patrick Monahan has noted, the situation in Khadr was unusual 
because it involved a prior ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court on the 
particular issue before the Supreme Court: the legality of the proceedings 
under international law.
110
 A decidedly different circumstance would 
arise in the absence of such a prior finding. More interesting and 
potentially problematic from a number of perspectives would be if the 
U.S. Court had found no violation of international law in these 
proceedings. To what extent would the Supreme Court of Canada have 
deferred to such findings or engaged in its own independent analysis? 
This raises the possibility of high courts of different countries reaching 
different conclusions on the interpretation of international law to the 
same proceedings. This would certainly be an international judicial 
dialogue, albeit a loud and messy one. 
The use of foreign law in Khadr is thus decidedly different than in 
the sniffer dog cases. In some ways it resembles private international law 
cases involving the enforcement of foreign judgments where a Canadian 
court examines the law in a foreign jurisdiction because it has direct 
bearing on the issues before the Canadian court.
111
 Moreover, Khadr 
demonstrates the increasing entanglement of international law and 
foreign law in domestic constitutional issues. Finally, we turn to the last 
example of the (non-) use of comparative law in 2008 — the most 
important equality decision in a decade. 
                                                                                                             
108 542 U.S. 466 (2004) [hereinafter “Rasul”]. 
109 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006) [hereinafter “Hamdan”]. 
110 See Patrick J. Monahan & James Gotowiec, “Constitutional Cases 2007: An Overview” 
(2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at 13-14. 
111 See, e.g., Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] S.C.J. No. 77, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 (S.C.C.) 
(enforceability of a Florida judgment by a Quebec court). 
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V. OPPORTUNITY MISSED: R. V. KAPP 
R. v. Kapp is certainly one of the most significant constitutional 
cases of the 2008 Term if not the decade. In Kapp, the Supreme Court 
appeared to turn its back on its 1999 Law decision and its problematic 
multi-contextual dignity analysis.
112
 The Court harkened back to the 
beginning of its section 15 analysis, returning to its 1989 decision in 
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.
113
 Kapp is remarkable on 
many different levels and will continue to be the subject of much 
analysis for some time. Here I wish to focus solely on one aspect of it: its 
use of comparative law. Or, to be more precise, its absolute failure to use 
comparative law. There is no comparative law in Kapp and this was an 
opportunity missed for reasons described below.  
In Kapp, a group of commercial fishers challenged the federal 
government‟s Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy in British Columbia, which 
granted a communal fishing licence to three Aboriginal Bands permitting 
fishers designated by the Bands to fish for salmon in the mouth of the 
Fraser River for a period of 24 hours and to sell their catch. The 
commercial fishers asserted that the granting of such licences violated 
their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter. The Court upheld 
the program as a valid ameliorative program under section 15(2) of the 
Charter and further elaborated on the relationship between the two 
subsections of section 15.
114
 Most notably, however, the Court 




The place of and for comparative law in Kapp is intertwined with the 
larger narrative of the case. Given the criticism of Law from the bar and 
the academy, it is not surprising that the Supreme Court would elect to 
reconsider the complicated multi-factored framework set out in that case. 
However, the Court gave no indication prior to rendering its decision that 
                                                                                                             
112 Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 10, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. For academic criticism of Law, see the sources cited in 
Kapp, supra, note 10, at para. 22, notes 1 and 2. I acknowledge that this interpretation of Kapp is 
contested and that some interpret Kapp as a natural progression from Law. How one views Kapp is 
important not only for one‟s view of the interpretative framework under s. 15 of the Charter but also 
for the role of comparative law in Kapp and under s. 15. 
113 [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”]. A 2009 
decision appears to confirm the abandonment of Law and return to the Andrews framework. See 
Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, [2009] S.C.J. No. 9, 2009 SCC 9 (S.C.C.). 
114 For more discussion of Kapp, see Michael H. Morris & Joseph K. Cheng, “Lovelace and 
Law Revisited: The Substantive Equality Promise of Kapp” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 281. 
115 See Kapp, supra, note 10, at paras. 14-24. 
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it was considering revisiting Law in Kapp.
116
 To be sure, the Court did 
not overrule or expressly disavow Law in Kapp and one interpretation of 
Kapp is of incremental change to the section 15 framework rather than of 
wholesale doctrinal change.
117
 I do not believe, however, that this is the 
best reading of the Court‟s decision in Kapp and the Supreme Court‟s 
subsequent pronouncements in the area support the contention that, at the 
least, Law has been shelved for the meantime.
118
  
The return to the Andrews framework was highly significant. 
However, it was accompanied by minimal analysis of other possible 
approaches to the interpretation of section 15. This failure to consider 
and evaluate other doctrinal approaches to equality in Kapp does reveal, 
however, the positive role that comparative law can potentially play in 
constitutional adjudication. The lack of transparency in the Kapp judgment 
is problematic. In many ways, the judgment raises more questions than it 
answers. We do not know why the Court decided to revisit Law in this 
case. We do not know why the Court did not ask the parties or the 
intervenors to address this issue in their factums or at the hearing.
119
 We 
do not know what other competing frameworks for section 15 the Court 
considered. It is clear that the Court must have explicitly turned its mind 
to the issue of the appropriate rubric for section 15 analysis; it just did 
not disclose this process in its reasons. A fuller canvassing of the 
alternative approaches to the interpretation of equality could have 
answered some of these questions and strengthened the legitimacy of the 
Court‟s reasons in Kapp. 
The use of comparative law would have been particularly appropriate 
in this case because the line from Kapp to Andrews is not a direct one. 
Much has transpired jurisprudentially and contextually between Andrews 
in 1989 and Kapp nearly two decades later. Brian Dickson was still Chief 
                                                                                                             
116 As Counsel for the intervenor Attorney General of Ontario in Kapp explained, no party 
raised the issue of revisiting the Law framework for s. 15 in their factums, nor did the Court query 
any of the parties or the intervenors on this issue at the hearing. See Sarah T. Kraicer, “R. v. Kapp: 
Aboriginal Fishing, Andrews and Affirmative Action in the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 25 
N.J.C.L. 153, at 155 (asserting that Kapp provided an opportunity for the Court to respond to some 
of the critical commentary about Law — that it is overly complex and unduly focused on the 
difficult concept of “human dignity”. “[N]one of the parties before the court, however, had raised 
these concerns with the Law analysis”). 
117 On the idea of judicial minimalism, see Cass R. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized 
Agreements” (1995) 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1733 and Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial 
Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
118 See Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v. Canada, supra, note 113, in which the 
Supreme Court does not mention Law and refers only to Andrews for the s. 15 framework of 
analysis. 
119 See supra, note 110. 
472 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2009), 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Justice and not a single member of the current Supreme Court had yet 
been appointed to Ottawa.
120
 Jurisprudentially, the Court has struggled 
with the interpretation of equality for 20 years. Methodologically, much 
has been written about equality analysis since then.
121
 Socially, hopes of 




Turning to the broader international context of equality, since 1989, 
South Africa has enacted a Constitution with a Bill of Rights 
significantly influenced by the Charter and New Zealand now also has a 
(statutory) Bill of Rights with an even stronger Canadian influence. 
Canadian equality decisions — including Andrews — have been studied, 
cited, adopted, distinguished and disapproved by courts in these 
countries.
123
 While the Supreme Court in Kapp took note of the academic 
criticism of Law, it did not consider other various possibilities, preferring 
instead to wipe clean the 20-year slate of equality jurisprudence and 
return to 1989. Comparative analysis could have shown how Canadian 
equality decisions have been received in other jurisdictions and how 
other countries approach this “most difficult right”.
124
 Comparative 
analysis could have also responded to some of the questions raised by the 
Kapp decision. Following the advice of the Chief Justice from 2001, 
comparative analysis could have been used “to survey the general 




                                                                                                             
120 In fact, McLachlin J. (as she then was) authored the lower court decision in Andrews 
which the Supreme Court of Canada rejected. Andrews was decided in February 1989 and 
McLachlin J. was appointed to the Supreme Court the next month. 
121 There are many articles and numerous books. See, e.g., papers contained in Fay Faraday, 
Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive 
Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006); Journal of Law and Equality; and the 
ongoing Women‟s Court of Canada project published in the Canadian Journal of Women and the 
Law.  
122 See generally the papers contained in Sheila McIntyre & Sanda Rogers, eds., Diminishing 
Returns: Inequality and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Markham, ON: LexisNexis 
Canada, 2006) (papers by Bruce Porter, Margot Young, Mayo Moran, Sheila McIntyre, Sonia 
Lawrence, Dianne Pothier, Yves Le Bouthillier, Sunera Thobani, Lee Lakeman, Nathalie Des 
Rosiers, Pearl Eliadis, Coleen Sheppard, Sanda Rogers, Hester Lessard, Shelley Gavigan, Pauline 
Rosenbaum & Ena Chadha, David Schneiderman and Mary Eberts). 
123 See supra, note 3.  
124 The Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 17, at 20-25 (reviewing equality analysis of other countries). 
125 Id., at 27. See also id., at 26 (“we may find it useful to look abroad”). 
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VI. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS 
The cases from the 2008 Supreme Court Term necessarily only 
provide a snapshot of the Court‟s use of comparative law in 
constitutional cases. Further qualitative and quantitative work is needed 
in order to provide a fuller account of the Court‟s use of comparative 
law.
126
 However, the cases from the Court‟s 2008 Term do provide the 
opportunity for some tentative conclusions and raise a number of further 
questions for consideration.  
First, the Court‟s use of comparative law was limited. Essentially, it 
only truly engaged in comparative analysis in two companion cases 
which are better viewed as a single constitutional double-feature. In these 
cases most of the comparative analysis was undertaken by a single judge, 
Binnie J., and most of the comparative attention was focused on a single 
jurisdiction, the United States. With the exception of one reference to a 
2005 U.S. Supreme Court case, all of these American references were to 
cases of the Rehnquist or Burger courts, to judges now retired or 
deceased. Together, these features give pause to talk about an ongoing 
“international judicial dialogue”. 
Second, the Court‟s use of comparative law in the 2008 constitutional 
cases raises questions about the future prospects of the Court‟s 
international influence. I began this paper with references by the Minister 
of Justice and others to the influence of the Charter and the Supreme 
Court of Canada on countries such as Israel, South Africa and New 
Zealand. With the exception of a sole passing reference to New Zealand, 
these jurisdictions were not mentioned in the limited comparative 
analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in 2008. If influence is a 
function of the willingness to engage with other countries,
127
 reciprocity 
may be lacking at the Supreme Court of Canada and may portend a 
future decline in its international influence. 
Finally, Khadr and Kapp each in their own way demonstrate 
possibilities for future comparative engagement. With increasing 
globalization and international entanglements, whether that be sniffer 
dogs or Canadians detained abroad, Canadian courts will likely be called 
upon to review relevant decisions of foreign tribunals. While this may 
raise the potential for conflict, it also creates the possibility of, if not the 
necessity for, deeper engagement with comparative constitutional law. 
                                                                                                             
126 In this respect see McCormick, “American Citations”, supra, note 9. 
127 See L‟Heureux-Dubé, “The Importance of Dialogue”, supra, note 31. 
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